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SHOULD THE SEC REGULATE THE CYBER SECURITIES
MARKET?
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR FRANKEL
OMRI YADLIN*
Tamar Frankel proposes a model for regulatory adaptation to
changing environments, and specifically, to the Internet.1 Frankel is a
well-known expert in the field of securities regulation, hence, her fo-
cus on the regulation of the emerging cyber capital market. In order
to demonstrate her theory, Frankel examines the response of the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
"Commission") to two phenomena: prospectus delivery via the Inter-
net and issuer trading sites.2 Frankel contends that insofar as pro-
spectus delivery is concerned, the Internet merely provides a new ve-
hicle for information transfer, and therefore, the SEC justifiably has
chosen to regulate this activity by analogy from its current rules.' Is-
suer trading sites, on the other hand, are a new feature for which the
pre-Internet rules are unsuitable, and hence, provides Professor
Frankel with an excellent paradigm for examining her theory on the
way in which law should adjust to changing environments.
Frankel identifies four types of mechanisms that can create and
adapt law: legislatures, administrative agencies, courts, and markets.'
After ruling out legislatures and courts, Frankel arrives at the conclu-
sion that optimal regulation of trading sites can be achieved only
through cooperation between the market and the SEC.' Indeed, the
SEC moves in this direction. The SEC's broad definition of the term
"exchange" ensures that agents undertaking a new, innovative trading
strategy would approach the Commission, reveal their plans, and re-
* Tel Aviv University, The Buchmann Faculty of Law.
1. See Tamar Frankel, The Internet, Securities Regulation, and Theory of Law, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1319 (1998).
2. For a review of developments in the cyber securities market, see Denis T. Rice, The
Internet, and the Cyber Securities Marketplace (visited Aug. 25, 1998) <http://
www.cyberlaw.com/securl297.html>.
3. See Frankel, supra note 1, at 1340.
4. See id. at 1327.
5. See id. at 1347-50.
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quest the removal of regulatory constraints. This dialogue improves
the SEC's understanding of emerging technology and its uses, and
highlights deficiencies in the prevailing regulatory scheme. Frankel's
claim is that this evolutionary, common law type of process should
lead to efficient regulation of the Internet.
In the first Part of this response to Professor Frankel's paper, I
attempt to challenge her conclusion that the market should not be the
sole regulator of issuer trading sites. I then move to examine the ef-
fect of the Internet on the regulation of prospectus delivery and,
more generally, on the regulation of information flow on the market.
I conclude with a discussion of Frankel's proposed model for coop-
eration between the SEC and the market.
I. SHOULD ISSUER TRADING SITES BE LEFT ALONE?
Frankel rejects the notion of allowing the market to act as the
sole regulator of issuer trading sites. At the foundation of this con-
clusion lies Frankel's claim that "nothing concerning trading sites
suggests that the fundamental policies of ensuring investor confidence
and facilitating capital formation should be changed. These remain
the main guides to the institutional structures of the market. Inex-
pensive enforcement of trades must be secured. Prices must be pub-
lished. Segmentation should be avoided. ', 6 I do not dispute Frankel's
contention that investor confidence and efficient capital formation
must always be important goals for any stock market regulator-in-
cluding regulators of Internet trading sites. However, it is not at all
clear that the means of achieving these goals should never be altered
and that the SEC should be given responsibility for achieving these
objectives.
Federal securities laws enhance investor confidence primarily by
fostering market liquidity. Mandatory disclosure, the ban on insider
trading, the regulation of brokers and dealers, etc. are all designed to
constrain bid-ask spreads and to facilitate a liquid market. In light of
this goal, it seems essential, as Frankel suggests, to secure "inexpen-
sive enforcement of trades" and to publish prices
Liquidity, however, is not the only instrument for ensuring inves-
tor confidence. Shareholders of close corporations, for example, do
not enjoy the same level of liquidity as shareholders in publicly-
6. Id. at 1349.
7. See id.
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traded firms, but are equipped with superior means for monitoring
the firm's agents, which serve also to maintain shareholder confi-
dence.
In the old days, the cost of expressing a voice in a publicly-traded
firm was so high that exit was seen as the only feasible remedy for
dissatisfied investors.' Securities laws were introduced to enhance the
liquidity of the markets and to reduce the cost of exit. However, the
Internet may have changed this cost-benefit analysis. The low cost of
communication in cyberspace enables firms to provide their share-
holders with a relatively cheap monitoring vehicle. Via the firm's
website, shareholders can keep a close tab on the firm's affairs, and
they can express their opinions and even vote by electronic ballot.
Consequently, some investors may agree to waive the protection of
securities laws and to slightly reduce their liquidity in exchange for
the opportunity to influence the firm's direction.
Arguably, some firms may even prefer a lower level of liquidity
because it encourages investors to collaborate with one another and
to engage more intensively in monitoring activities, rather than fol-
lowing the "Wall Street rule." 9 Liquidity and control are substitutes,
and the appropriate mix of voice and exit may vary for each firm, de-
pending on its size, industry, and relations with customers or with
employees. Therefore, the SEC should not concern itself with "inex-
pensive enforcement of trades" on issuer trading sites and should not
subject these sites to any of its liquidity-enhancing rules. Trading
rules, just as governance issues, should be determined by the firm's
articles and subject to the minimal restrictions of state corporate law.
We can find support for this conclusion in the history of securi-
ties legislation. The traditional division between securities regulation
and corporate law is based upon market practices that developed in
the nineteenth century. Costs of trade outside the exchange floor
were high, and therefore, firms preferred to list their shares and to
comply with the exchange listing requirement and trading rules. The
legal borders between securities regulation and corporate law mir-
rored the market division between exchange rules and corporate con-
tract.' °
8. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 277-87 (1932).
9. See generally Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of Stock Market Liquidity, 34 J. FIN.
ECON. 31 (1993); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991).
10. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Allocation of Government Authority: The Exchange as
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The development of issuer trading sites represents an attempt of
a few publicly-held firms to take back control of trading. These issu-
ers are trying to isolate their firms from the national stock market and
to detach themselves from certain institutions that control the stock
market-namely, broker-dealers, exchanges, and the SEC. These is-
suers do not take advantage of the infrastructures of the national
stock market and should not be forced to bear its disadvantages. In
this isolated setting, there is no reason why the firm's trading rules
and governance rules should be subject to two different bodies of law.
II. REGULATION OF PROSPECTUS DELIVERY
Professor Frankel claims that "the underlying policies of the se-
curities acts are not adversely affected by the use of the Internet to
deliver prospectuses. In fact, by reducing the costs of capital forma-
tion, the securities laws' policies are advanced."1 This claim is indis-
putable. However, I disagree with Frankel's claim that, in the area of
information transfer via the Internet, the SEC can opt for the route of
"regulation by analogy" rather than "start anew. 1 2
The Internet revolutionized the way in which information is cir-
culated, the way in which we search for information, and the way in
which we communicate and interact with one another. Federal secu-
rities laws would have been drafted very differently had the Internet
been available in 1933. Subsequent implementation and interpreta-
tion of these laws would have taken a very different course had the
Internet been in the background. This technological revolution,
therefore, forces us to rethink the fundamental principles of section 5
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") and of other dis-
closure rules.
Section 5 is based on the assumption that, whereas issuers can
easily address the public, it is very expensive for investors to respond
and ask for clarifications. Given this assumption, Congress sought to
set disclosure standards that would reduce to a minimum the risk of
incoherence and eliminate any need for the investor to inquire about
the information furnished. Hence, section 5(b)(1) of the 1933 Act en-
sures that during the waiting period any written or broadcasted offer
for sale is made only by means of a prospectus that meets the re-
Regulator, 83 VA. L. REv. 1453 (1997).
11. Frankel, supra note 1, at 1335.
12. Id. at 1336.
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quirements of section 10.13 Similar constraints do not apply to oral of-
fers,14 arguably because in such a direct communication, the offeree
can respond and ask the offeror to clarify her statement.
The limitations of section 5 on free speech during the pre-filing
and waiting periods deprive investors of access to material informa-
tion. Thus, section 5 curtails the issuer's ability to promote the of-
fering and forces firms to disseminate information on an unequal ba-
sis. Oral communications are made solely to underwriters and
institutional investors, whereas the public has access only to informa-
tion included in the prospectus.
These limitations prevent the market from taking advantage of
one of the most important features of the Internet: it is interactive.
Thus, it synthesizes the advantages of television, radio, and the print
media with those of the telephone or a face-to-face conversation. Via
the Internet, offerees can access issuers' files, and offerors can open
the door to investor inquiries. 5 Moreover, issuers can set up a chat
room so that any communication between a firm's agents and an in-
vestor would be accessible to the public at large. In this setting,
therefore, the distinction between oral and written communication
becomes meaningless. Issuers and underwriters should be free to
conduct road shows on the Internet and to invite the public to par-
ticipate in such presentations. 6 Such a relaxation of section 5 would
provide more information to the public, on a more equal basis, 7 and
would allow issuers to test the waters before they jump into the capi-
tal market pool.
Section 5 of the 1933 Act is not the only area in need of "a new
start." The regulation of proxy contests seems anachronistic as well,
considering the Internet's cheap accessibility for shareholders and the
opportunities it offers for dialogue and collaboration between share-
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994).
14. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 135 (8th ed. 1998).
15. Issuers may be exempted from section 5 if they can show that "the offeree could realis-
tically take advantage of his access to ascertain the relevant information." Doran v. Petroleum
Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1977).
16. Indeed, the SEC allows issuers and underwriters to conduct electronic road shows, but
access to these road shows is limited to certain authorized viewers consisting primarily of institu-
tional investors and investment advisors. See Bloomberg L.P., SEC No-Action Letter, in 1997
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1023, at *7-8 (Oct. 22, 1997).
17. This "equal access" claim does not imply that the SEC should force issuers to make all
their oral representations available on the Internet. Issuers and underwriters may have a legiti-
mate interest in providing more information to institutional investors who, in return, provide the
issuer and the underwriter useful information about demand for the offering.
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holders and for direct monitoring of the firm's management. The
Internet, therefore, intensifies the adverse effects of proxy rules on
shareholder activism."8
The Internet also may provide added force to the call to dis-
imply a private right of action under Rule 10b-519 and to return to the
explicit private remedy of section 18 of the Securities Act of 1934
("1934 Act"). 0 The section 18 remedy is subject to two constraints:
(1) liability is restricted to misstatements in documents filed with the
SEC; and (2) plaintiffs must demonstrate their actual reliance on a
misstatement.2 ' But in actuality, before the Internet age, access to
SEC files was costly and investors were not able to distinguish be-
tween disclosures that were filed with the SEC and those less trust-
worthy statements which were not filed. Moreover, the reliance
threshold was too difficult and too expensive to overcome.
In response to these deficiencies in section 18, federal courts rec-
ognized a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 . In light of inves-
tor inability to identify filed documents, courts could "conceive of no
rational purpose which would be furthered by creating a structure
where liability for material misrepresentations adversely affecting in-
vestors would vary tremendously depending upon whether the state-
ment happened to be filed with the SEC."'
The next step taken by federal courts was to relinquish the reli-
ance requirement by adopting the fraud on the market theory.2' This
move saved plaintiffs the heavy burden of proving actual reliance and
opened the door to a flood of class actions under Rule 10b-5.
The cheap access to the SEC site in the Internet enables inves-
tors to easily identify filed disclosures and to discount the veracity of
information that was not filed. Furthermore, the Internet might offer
a new means of demonstrating reliance. For example, the fact that a
trader surfed through a misleading filed document shortly before
trading can be used as a proxy for her reliance. Therefore, if we still
adhere to the rationale underlying the constraints of section 18, we
18. For an interesting story that illustrates this point, see Carole Gould, Turning the Tables:
This Time, a Shareholder Is Being Sued, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998, at B7.
19. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Right of Action Under the Federal Secu-
rities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REv. 961,976-98 (1994).
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1994).
21. See id.
22. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
23. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545,556 (2d Cir. 1979).
24. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 251 (1988).
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can recapture its advantages by disimplying the private right of action
under Rule 10b-5. Firms will be able to decide which of their volun-
tary statements they wish to support with a warranty by filing it with
the SEC site and which of their disclosures are too speculative and
risky to guarantee. Hence, the amount of information available to
the public is likely to increase. The reliance requirement would en-
sure that compensation is afforded only to informed traders who
gather and analyze publicly-available information, thereby operating
the invisible hand of the efficient market.
III. FRANKEL'S PARADIGM OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SEC
AND THE MARKET
Professor Frankel recognizes the advantages of market experi-
mentation, but she believes that the SEC should stay in control of this
mammoth laboratory. Under Frankel's model, the SEC fulfills two
functions in this experimentation process. Its first role is to design the
experiment. Through its no-action letters, the SEC sets limits on
market activities and prohibits overly-risky experiments. "[T]he
stakes are too high," claims Frankel, "to allow promoters to break...
new grounds in shaping the new institutions for markets., 25 The
SEC's second role is to observe the market and to draw conclusions
from the experiments. Frankel predicts that the SEC will adopt the
best practices or customs developed in the market and will ban the
bad practices.26
My skepticism rests on two grounds. First, even if we have con-
fidence in the SEC's competence to distinguish between good and
bad practices, once the SEC decides to enforce a good practice, that
practice might lose its efficiency. The 1933 and 1934 Acts are good
examples of laws founded on market practices. Thus, for example,
having noticed that reputed underwriters conduct investigations of
the issuer's affairs, Congress decided to enforce this practice by
holding underwriters liable for any misstatement included in a regis-
tration statement unless they can prove they have conducted such a
diligent investigation.27 However, by bolstering reputed underwriters'
conscientious investigations with legal liability, Congress changed the
practice, arguably for the worse.
The second reason for my skepticism is Frankel's assumption
25. Frankel, supra note 1, at 1349.
26. See id. at 1350-51.
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5) (1994).
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
that the SEC is capable of distinguishing between good and bad prac-
tices. I find this assumption troubling, especially given the fact that
the SEC controls the laboratory and prohibits experimenting with
unorthodox methods. In this sense, Frankel's concept of experimen-
tation is very different from what transpired in the context of the 1933
Act. The 1933 Congress stepped in and examined practices and cus-
toms that developed in a (relatively) free market. I suspect that sev-
eral efficient practices would not have evolved had the federal gov-
ernment overseen this market throughout its formative years during
the nineteenth century. For example, a nineteenth century regulator
might not have approved of experimenting with the fixed price of-
fering, which is still the dominant method of floating a public offering.
This speculation is supported by the fact that a few years after the se-
curities laws were enacted, the government brought criminal pro-
ceedings against seventeen investment bankers, claiming that the
fixed price offering method violates the Sherman Act. The court
rejected the government's theory, primarily because the fixed price
offering was adopted by the 1933 Act as the model method for mak-
ing a public offering. It took finance scholarship another three dec-
ades to develop insightful economic justifications for this floating
method. 9
Just as a nineteenth century regulator, unfamiliar with contem-
porary finance scholarship, could not grasp the efficiency of the fixed
price offering, regulators today cannot comprehend the sociology of
human interaction and of institutions on the Internet. Thus any at-
tempt to regulate these experiments is likely to restrict the evolution
of efficient practices.
Consider, for example, trading sites. Although the SEC ap-
proved their establishment, it imposed several constraints on their
operation. The most significant limitation is that the issuer is not
permitted to make a market for its shares. Frankel's assumption that
"nothing concerning trading sites suggests that the fundamental poli-
cies of ensuring investor confidence and facilitating capital should be
changed" necessarily leads her to the conclusion that if issuers are not
making a market in the "real" world, they should not be allowed to
do so on their Internet trading sites."
28. See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621,628-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
29. For example, see Kevin Rock, Why New Issues are Underpriced, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 187,
188-89 (1986).
30. See Frankel, supra note 1, at 1349.
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However, the reasons for excluding issuers from the market-
making business in the "real" world do not necessarily hold with re-
gard to issuer trading sites. Arguably, this ban is designed to serve
the issuer's interest in that it facilitates a more competitive market for
its shares. The issuer is typically better informed than other dealers
and, therefore, is able to set narrower bid-ask spreads. In the face of
such an unequal playing field, dealers would refrain from making a
market for the issuer's shares. Consequently, any issuers who wish to
draw dealers into the market for their shares must refrain from com-
peting with them. The prohibition on issuer market-making, just like
disclosure rules and the ban on insider trading, is designed to protect
the broker-dealer industry and to facilitate a competitive stock mar-
ket.
In the isolated setting of the issuer trading site, on the other
hand, there seems to be no reason to prevent issuers from playing an
active role in the market for their outstanding securities. Such issuers
are trying to bypass intermediaries (underwriters, market-makers,
etc.), and they certainly are not interested in attracting independent
dealers to make a market for their shares. Hence, there is no need to
subject these issuers to any of the intermediary-protection rules.
Indeed, as Frankel points out, the lack of intermediaries raises
some difficulties with enforcement of trades.3" Arguably, however,
the requirement that issuers play a passive role in the operation of
their trading sites precludes the evolution of efficient enforcement
mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms operated by the issuer.
Frankel further suggests that issuers' control of trading sites
threatens the integrity of the sites, as issuers may use their dominant
position to manipulate the market.32 Although I have some reserva-
tions regarding the ability of issuers to manipulate the market,33 espe-
cially when investors are aware of the issuer's dominant position , I
do agree that this favorable position enables the issuer, like any other
monopolist, to charge extreme markups. However, this threat hardly
justifies imposing a total ban on issuer market-making. Issuers would
be able to solicit investments in their securities only if they were to
provide a mechanism that restricts their ability to exploit their domi-
nant position. For example, issuers could commit, in their initial
31. See id. at 1343-44.
32. See id. at 1344-45.
33. See Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation" in Fi-
nancial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 541 (1991).
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public offering, to a fixed or a maximum markup. The SEC's refusal
to allow issuers to make a market for their shares prevents the evolu-
tion of such practices. Consequently, we might never know if these
practices are efficient.
Despite my criticism, I join Frankel in her call for cooperation
between the SEC and markets. My concept of cooperation, however,
is quite different from Frankel's. In my view, the primary role of the
SEC in cyberspace should be to facilitate competition between public
and private regulators by drawing clear borders between Internet ju-
risdictions. The SEC may compete with other regulators, but it
should not use any coercive means to control cyberspace.
Competition between regulators can be efficient only if firms are
free to choose a regulator and if investors can move easily from one
jurisdiction to another. Just as firms can opt for their applicable cor-
porate law, they should be free to opt for their preferred lawmaker
and enforcer in the area of securities regulation.' Firms should be
allowed to contract for the most appropriate cyber "jurisdiction,"
whether governed by the SEC, a state, or a foreign or a private regu-
lator, and to list their shares with the cyber jurisdiction they select.
Similarly, investors should be free to surf through these jurisdictions
and to play the most efficient one. The low transaction costs of
shifting from website to website ensure a more efficient playground
for competition between regulators, and should yield htetter rules.
Currently, however, instead of taking this pro-competitive role,
the SEC responds to competitive pressures by discriminating between
actors on the basis of their ability to evade SEC jurisdiction: Regula-
tion S," and Rules 506,36 144, 37 and 144A38 all determine borders ac-
cording to geography, citizenship, and sophistication, and they thus
force firms to incur enormous legal fees in order to find their way
through or around this regulatory maze. Investors have great diffi-
culty distinguishing between the different market segments and
knowing which standards apply to each transaction they undertake.
They can all be saved from this mass of confusion if entrepreneurs
were allowed to pick the regulator of their choice. This is probably
the only safe way to enable firms and investors to make optimal use
of the Internet without bearing the risk of being subject to a number
34. See Mahoney, supra note 10, at 1497-99.
35. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (1998).
36. See id. § 230.506.
37. See id. § 230.144.
38. See id. § 230.144A.
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of jurisdictions, each prescribing different, sometimes conflicting,
rules.
The move from coercion to consent should not necessarily re-
duce the amount of business that the SEC regulates. The SEC has a
comparative advantage in the enforcement business and will probably
remain the most effective sheriff in the global town. Many entrepre-
neurs would still be interested in offering their investors the protec-
tion of SEC enforcement. The SEC would be able to condition its en-
forcement services on the adoption of contractual terms that lower its
enforcement costs. The SEC market power in the enforcement busi-
ness, therefore, would enable the SEC to keep or even increase its
share of the global market.
The model of cooperation I am suggesting still leaves room for
coercive enforcement, but only in cases where a given trading activity
has a spill-over effect on the SEC market. For example, some trading
systems take a free ride on stock exchange transparency. Under such
circumstances, SEC intervention to protect stock exchange property
rights may be justified. Issuer trading sites, on the other hand, do not
raise any spill-over problem, for these issuers do not list their shares
on any of the regulated exchanges and do not use the services of
other regulated intermediaries. Hence, the SEC should not enforce
its rules on such trading sites unless the operator of the site chooses
the SEC as its preferred regulator.
IV. SUMMARY
The 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, and the regulations pursuant thereto
have been the subject of debate since their promulgation. Frankel's
position in this debate clearly is in support of maintaining these laws.
Although she recognizes the need to adapt the old rules to new tech-
nology, she believes that the philosophy of the regulation should re-
main the same and that the SEC still should be in full control of the
cybermarket.
In response, I have tried to point out the ways in which prevail-
ing regulation and SEC intervention may impede the evolution of an
efficient cyber stock market. The territorial approach of federal secu-
rities laws restricts the ability of entrepreneurs and investors to take
full advantage of the cheap travelling costs in cyberspace. Similarly,
limitations on issuer and investor freedom of speech, which were
based on the 1930s technology, do not allow agents to interact as ef-
fectively as the new technology now affords. Hence, although I en-
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
dorse Professor Frankel's call for cooperation between the Commis-
sion and the market, I believe that such cooperation would lead to
more efficient results if it were to be based on consent rather than on
coercion.
Frankel contends that after sixty-five years of securities regula-
tion, it is costly to revolutionize the whole system, to forego the man-
datory character of these laws, and to move to contracts. 9 But the
Internet provides us with a relatively inexpensive opportunity to do
just this: to create a competitive environment on the Internet while
maintaining the current infrastructure and mandatory rules of the
"real" world. As long as the securities at stake are not traded simul-
taneously on any of the regulated stock exchanges, the SEC can treat
the Internet trading site as a foreign stock exchange. Artificial as this
may be, we can transcend geography in cyberspace, yet stand with
both feet securely planted in the real world. In the long run, our ex-
perience with the Internet may teach us that we should encourage
competition between regulators in the real world as well. 4°
39. See Frankel, supra note 1, at 1331-33.
40. See Mahoney, supra note 10, at 1491-96.
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